Peter Bauer and the Failure of Foreign Aid by Shleifer, Andrei
 
Peter Bauer and the Failure of Foreign Aid
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Shleifer, Andrei. 2009. Peter Bauer and the Failure of Foreign Aid.
Cato Journal 29(3): 379-390.
Published Version http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj29n3/cj29n3-1.pdf
Accessed February 19, 2015 10:00:53 AM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:8705862
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#OAPPeter Bauer and the Failure of Foreign Aid
1. 
Andrei Shleifer, January 2007, Revised July 2009 
 
1.  The foreign aid debacle.  
  Peter Bauer was one of the greatest development economists in history.   He was 
an advocate of property rights protection and free trade before these ideas became 
commonplace.   He appreciated before others did the crucial roles of entrepreneurship 
and trade in development.  He was also one of the earliest opponents of the 
overpopulation thesis, recognizing that the poor like the rich should have the right to 
choose the number of children they have, that many developing countries are under-
populated, and that population growth will anyhow slow down once they become richer.  
Bauer’s writings are remarkable for their deep humanity and commitment to the welfare 
of the people in the developing world, but without the fake sanctimony that characterizes 
much of the modern rhetoric.  
Bauer is perhaps best known as a persistent and articulate critic of foreign aid.  At 
least since 1972, he saw it as not only failing to speed up, but actually hurting economic 
development.   He started his criticism when foreign aid to the developing world was 
only getting underway, and never wavered.   He defined foreign aid as “a transfer of 
resources from the taxpayer of a donor country to the government of a recipient country 
(1975, p. 396).”   Needless to say, this did not endear him to the aid establishment. 
Indeed, thirty years ago, just as today, a critic of foreign aid was ridiculed for 
being inhumane and insensitive to the plight of the poor.  Bauer’s 1972 book was savaged 
by the surly (now Sir) Nicholas Stern, who wrote that “Dissent on Development is not a 
                                                 
1 This paper is a summary of remarks made at a conference in memory of Peter Bauer at the London School 
of Economics in 2006.   It is not intended as a summary of Bauer’s work.  For recent summaries and 
interpretations, see, for example, Dorn (2002) and Vasquez (2007).   
  1valuable contribution to the study of development (1974, p. 209).”  Stern’s case for aid 
was simple: people in the rich countries are much richer than people in the poor ones, and 
therefore foreign aid is their moral obligation.  This observation was supplemented with a 
sprinkling of success stories, and a criticism of Bauer for excessive reliance on examples.  
Little has changed in 30 years.  In retrospect, Bauer looks both prescient and courageous. 
  And prescient he was.  Countless empirical studies have failed to find beneficial 
effects of official foreign aid.   The consensus that aid has failed is nearly universal 
among those who look at the data.   Perhaps the most important recent statement of this 
conclusion is William Easterly’s account of both the history and the evidence on foreign 
aid (Easterly 2003, 2006, 2009).  
  The failure of foreign aid is all the more remarkable once we remember that, in 
the last quarter century, the world has experienced an enormous spurt of economic 
growth and social development.  I have elsewhere (Shleifer 2009) called this period “The 
Age of Milton Friedman” and documented its enormous accomplishments.  Starting from 
East Asia, and concluding most recently with India and China, nearly all the countries in 
Asia (where much of the world’s population lives) have experienced rapid economic and 
social progress.  The collapse of communism started the period of economic transition in 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union which, while difficult at the start, within a 
few years has brought rapid economic growth in the whole region.   Even the current 
economic crisis will slow down, but is highly unlikely to reverse, these achievements.  
Economic success has not been as conspicuous in Latin America and Africa.   Even those 
regions, however, judging by many indicators of human development, such as health, 
education, and poverty reduction, have seen substantial progress.   
  2  Economic growth has been accompanied by improvements in the quality of life 
for billions of people.  Extreme poverty is declining at staggering rates.  Life expectancy 
has grown tremendously around the world.  Literacy and education have improved 
rapidly.  Starting in the mid 1970s, when Bauer began to criticize foreign aid, the world 
has experienced unbelievable growth in democracy and human rights.    
  The sources of economic progress are becoming increasingly apparent.  Over the 
last quarter century, the world has embraced capitalism and free trade.  Indicators of 
property rights protection around the world have improved dramatically.  Tariffs and 
other impediments to foreign trade are down.  Tax rates have often fallen, especially on 
corporate income.  Interventions in capital and foreign exchange markets have been 
greatly reduced.  Fewer governments just print money to cover their deficits.  Large parts 
of the world undertook massive waves of privatization and other reductions of the state’s 
role in the economy.  The list goes on.   Against this background of economic 
development and the rise of free markets, the inability to find any benefits of foreign aid 
is even more remarkable.  One might have thought that foreign aid would have done 
better when the world is growing and democratizing, as it did in the last thirty years, than 
under less propitious circumstances.   But there is no evidence of its contribution, despite 
a substantial effort to find it (Easterly 2009).  
Bauer and subsequent writers have advanced several reasons for this dismal 
performance of foreign aid.   The ostensible purpose of aid, at least in the post World 
War II era, was to stimulate economic growth.  The intellectual support for many of the 
policy recommendations for how to allocate aid in order to stimulate economic growth 
was based on the big push model (Rosenstein-Rodan 1943).  According to that model, 
  3what keeps countries behind is insufficient investment across sectors of the economy and 
in infrastructure.  To the extent that foreign aid supplies investment capital, it jump starts 
economic growth, and initiates a virtuous cycle whereby investment generates income 
and thus raises the economic return to further investment.   
 Bauer  relentlessly  criticized the big push model.  He argued that foreign aid 
providers do not know which investments are appropriate for a developing economy, so   
aid money is poured into bad projects (also known as white elephants), which not only 
fail to encourage economic growth, but divert scarce human and other resources away 
from productive uses.   The limited institutional and human capabilities of a country are 
wasted on unproductive rather than productive activities.  Aid destroys economic 
incentives, leads to misallocation of scarce resources, and so not only fails to jump start, 
but actually undermines growth.  Easterly (2006) discusses these arguments in detail, and 
supplies considerable evidence supporting Bauer’s skepticism about the big push.  
  Easterly (2009) surveys the many reasons for the poor performance of foreign aid, 
but the basic ideas go back to Bauer.  One approach is to follow the long and intricate 
road that a dollar of a Western taxpayer’s money must follow before it reaches a needing 
recipient in a developing country.  Think about what happens to that dollar.  First, it must 
be allocated by the donor country’s government.  That government has its national 
political, military, and economic objectives, such as supporting friendly states, selling its 
food and weapons, promoting its own consultants, intervening in international conflicts, 
and so on.   Traditionally, much of bilateral foreign aid has been tied to purchases from 
donor countries, although apparently this phenomenon has seen some decline (Easterly 
  42009).  Many of these objectives have little to do with development.  A large chunk of 
the U.S. development assistance, for example, is military support for Egypt and Israel. 
Even for the part of the Western taxpayer’s dollar intended for development, the 
donor country’s government can have incorrect or even bizarre ideas for how to spend it.  
Think of the Swedish government’s support of socialist policies in Tanzania, which most 
observers believe have failed.  Or the French government’s support of petty Francophile 
dictators in its ex colonies in West Africa, designed to expand the French sphere of 
influence.  In a similar vein, countries may choose to spend “development” money on 
their own firms and contractors undertaking projects abroad.   Much of the money of 
course stays at home.  The role of kickbacks, bribes, and campaign contributions in 
shaping decisions on foreign aid by donor countries is only beginning to be understood.  
  But suppose that some fraction of that initial dollar actually reaches a bilateral or 
multilateral development agency with the intention that it be spent on actual development 
as opposed to arms procurement or transfers to Western firms and farms.   In addition to 
having significant staffs of their own, these institutions often have ideas of their own, as 
well as constraints on how to spend the money dictated by donor priorities.  For example, 
coordinated investment spending a la big push was the prevailing development wisdom 
for much of the 1970s, which may have resulted in a significant misallocation of 
resources.  Furthermore, development institutions have a strong incentive to spend – push 
the money out (this is the true big push).   This means that countries willing to accept the 
most money, as grants or as loans, and to spend it on the biggest projects, become the 
most attractive candidates for aid.   There is not much evidence that aid is allocated to 
countries that spend it more wisely (Easterly 2006). 
  5  But let us keep following whatever is left of the Western taxpayer’s dollar.  
Suppose that some fraction of that original dollar is now lent or given as a grant to a 
government in a developing country for some purpose that may contribute to 
development.   As has been extensively documented, in many instances the first instinct 
of the officials receiving the funds is to steal them.  Many a developing country leader 
has become a billionaire courtesy of foreign aid.  When the money is not stolen by the 
leader, there are the various ministers, officials, and other bureaucrats who all want a cut. 
  This problem is particularly severe in the case of foreign loans, which is how the 
World Bank and the IMF deliver most foreign aid.   Because loans are sovereign 
obligations of the receiving country, it is difficult for the donors to control how they are 
spent: conditionality is typically a failure (Svensson 2003, Easterly 2009).  Because loans 
come in the form of cash, they are particularly vulnerable to diversion.  And of course, 
unlike aid grants, loans become the obligation of the borrowing country, and therefore are 
supposed to be eventually repaid – a tax on future resources.    
The consequences of this structure have been dramatic.  The loans to developing 
countries have come to be known as “odious debt” because the proceeds are stolen by the 
governments and the citizens are taxed to repay.  The debt has been largely rescheduled 
and rarely repaid.  Indeed, donor countries came under severe criticism for even asking 
for repayment.  In many countries, especially in Latin America, borrowing from the IMF 
and the World Bank was condemned by the left as the attempt by capitalist West to 
destabilize the developing economies.   Far from being seen as an exercise in 
benevolence that promoted development, foreign aid in the form of loans has energized 
the left in its support of economic and social policies most antithetical to development.    
  6The diversion of foreign aid by officials in recipient countries is not, 
unfortunately, just a lump sum tax.  To begin, when diversion of aid money is a 
significant issue, recipient governments begin to seek assistance for projects from which 
it is easier to steal and where spending is harder to monitor.  The composition of aid 
spending is then distorted.  And just as donor countries want to allocate aid money for 
national priorities, recipient governments want to spend it for their national priorities 
which may, but need not, coincide with development needs.  The recipient governments 
want to allocate money to their friends, families, and political supporters, to pursue 
military and foreign policy goals, etc.  Like the donor governments, the recipient 
governments often, perhaps even more often, have bizarre ideas about development.  And 
so another fraction of that Western taxpayer’s dollar is wasted.   
  But remember that money, of what is left of it, is still in the recipient country’s 
capital.  The small piece of it designated for some activity that resembles economic or 
social development is yet to be spent for that purpose.  That piece still needs to pass 
through the treasury, the spending ministry, the regional offices, and the actual spenders 
in the developing country.  At each turn, some fraction is diverted, misspent, or wasted.   
According to Reinikka and Svensson (2004), 13 cents out of each dollar of the Ugandan 
government’s expenditure on schools actually reached those schools.  Not all of that 
waste is malevolent.  Western governments have a lot of trouble spending money 
efficiently; the human and administrative capabilities of developing country governments 
are considerably lower, as is the efficiency of their spending.   
Last but not least, when the money reaches a designated recipient – a bridge 
builder, a teacher, or a farmer – that recipient must spend it wisely.   The bridge builder 
  7must build the bridge, the teacher must show up at school, the farmer must use his 
fertilizer.  None of these can be taken for granted.  Indeed, the lesson of development 
economics of the last decade is that there is tremendous corruption, waste and resource 
misallocation at every stage.   Bridges are not built (or collapse soon after if built), 
teachers stay at home, and farmers retain old production techniques.     
The bottom line is that perhaps a few pennies of the original Western taxpayer’s 
dollar are actually spent as might be designed and implemented by a benevolent and 
effective social planner.   The rest is wasted or diverted.   Easterly suggests that a trillion 
dollars has been spent on foreign aid since World War II.  But how much has actually 
been delivered wisely to the intended recipients of that aid?  Viewed from the perspective 
of a dollar traveling from the Western taxpayer’s pocket to the intended ultimate 
recipient, the failure of foreign aid is not all that puzzling.  
As important, the diversion of most of the dollar before a few pennies reach an 
intended recipient is not development neutral—this diversion may actually undermine 
development because it interferes with the political and institutional processes that might 
actually be beneficial to a country.  For example, many social scientists believe in the 
idea going back to the Magna Carta (and which has some empirical support as well), that 
governments should have to raise taxes to finance their spending, so that they are forced 
to seek the consent of the governed.  By breaking the link between government resources 
and its ability to tax, foreign aid might undermine the basic contract between the 
government and the governed.   And to the extent that the evolution of indigenous 
political institutions is a central element of economic and social development, these 
adverse effects of foreign aid might be as significant as the meager benefits it provides.  
  8Another way to make this point is to focus on economic policy.  Pro-market 
economic policies have been as important as anything we know of in fostering economic 
development.  Yet foreign aid, by relaxing the budget constraint of the government, in 
many instances has the effect of delaying the introduction of such good policies.  In the 
1980s and 1990s, the donors tried to address this problem by linking aid to policy reform.   
The donors often failed, because the client governments resisted, because they failed to 
deliver policy reform even when they accepted conditionality, and because conditionality 
was severely criticized in the West for interfering with the sovereignty of developing 
countries (Svensson 2003).  Today, the promotion of good policies through conditionality 
is at best a half-hearted foreign aid priority. 
The bottom line is that Bauer was correct about foreign aid.   Foreign aid has 
failed to meet its principal objective: to spur economic growth.  The reasons for its failure 
are probably multiple and more complex – and more numerous -- than just a failed model 
of development.   But the evidence has broadly corroborated Bauer’s view: an important 
instance of economic analysis making a correct prediction about reality in advance. 
  
2. Foreign Welfare.    
The foreign aid community did not disregard this evidence of failure that has 
accumulated since the 1970s.  But it did not conclude that foreign aid is a bad idea, either.  
Instead, the conceptual framework for foreign aid has adjusted to the failure.  There are 
three parts to the new view.   First, the answer to the failure to identify the benefits of 
foreign aid is to spend more, not less.  It is the insufficiency of spending that explains our 
inability to find its benefits.  Second, growth has lost its dominance as the goal of foreign 
  9aid.  The goal should be poverty alleviation, which has the distinct advantage of lower 
accountability for the donors.  Foreign aid should become a massive welfare program for 
the developing world.  Third, what must support continued and increasing foreign aid 
expenditures is not proof of effectiveness, but sympathy of the Western taxpayers.   
Buildup of that sympathy through public relations has increasingly become the 
cornerstone of foreign aid.  
The change of objectives of foreign aid from growth to welfare is easy to defend.   
Investments in health and education are truly worthy humanitarian goals even when they 
do not lead to economic growth.  Although an argument has been made that investment in 
health, as opposed to physical capital, will ultimately promote growth, the evidence for 
this proposition is weak at best.  There is no evidence that health improvements have a 
causal benefit for growth.  There is not even evidence that the AIDS epidemic has had 
adverse consequences for growth in Africa, or, conversely, that progress against AIDS 
will accelerate growth (see the discussion in Easterly 2009).  Given the evidence, the 
current strategies of the world development community are unlikely to accelerate growth. 
In other ways, however, this change of approach is depressing, since it is entirely 
obvious that the world has seen only one way out of poverty, namely economic growth 
(see Besley and Burgess 2003).  India and China are only the most recent, as well as the 
most obvious, examples.  Developing country welfare, including health spending, may 
bring many desirable results if it actually works.  Saving and improving lives is important 
even with no growth effects.  The trouble is, without growth, welfare is permanent.  As 
the world moves to a foreign aid regime that looks so much like a welfare program, it 
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mechanisms totally unrelated to foreign aid, such as globalization, take care of growth.   
The transformation of foreign aid objective from economic growth to income 
support would not have been possible without a massive publicity campaign.   After all, 
welfare is unpopular in the wealthy Western countries, even with respect to taxpayers’ 
own compatriots.   Today, the Irish rock singer Bono, who has done more than anyone to 
support development spending, is probably the world’s most important development 
professional.   The World Bank in the 1990s has used a 400-person-strong public 
relations department to support the growth of aid.  More recently, the United Nations, 
which has joined the foreign aid business is earnest with its Millennium Development 
goals, has played a tremendous role in popularizing the cause of foreign aid.   
If one thinks that foreign aid is effective, and that in the rich world today one 
needs publicity to get approval of any expenditure, then these publicity campaigns are all 
for the good.  But, as always, the matter is more complex.   When publicity drives foreign 
aid spending, another crucial distortion enters the equation, namely that the public might 
want to see the money spent on causes of dubious value to human welfare.   
One area where the influence of public campaigns is seen most clearly is the fight 
against AIDS.   For several years, economists and public health experts have understood 
and stated clearly that the effective way of controlling AIDS is to spend money on 
prevention, not treatment.   Many prevention strategies, such as dissemination of 
condoms or even the use of antibiotics to treat venereal disease (and thus reduce the 
likelihood of AIDS transmission), are cheap and effective (Canning 2006).  In contrast, 
  11treatment of AIDS patients is vastly more expensive and less effective.  The economic 
and moral case for spending money on prevention rather than treatment is powerful.   
Yet that case does not make for good public relations.  The sympathy of the 
Western publics is with those already afflicted and suffering, not with those at risk of 
being so by engaging in unsafe sex.  The drug companies, likewise, have little 
commercial interest in prevention.  So the money followed the Western demand.  The 
response of foreign aid bureaucracy, particularly the UN bureaucracy, to the evidence on 
the relative effectiveness of prevention has been to accuse those advocating prevention of 
murder.   Treating the suffering AIDS victims makes for great TV, as well as helps 
extract money from Western governments, presumably to be channeled through the UN.   
The effect, of course, is exactly the opposite: it is the neglect of prevention that kills 
people.   Only recently, under the leadership of the Gates Foundation, has the 
development community acknowledged the vastly greater effectiveness of prevention.  It 
has not been calculated how many additional people were infected, and lives lost, due to 
the UN’s publicity-focused strategies.    
 
3. The Future of Foreign Aid.   
As this piece is being written, foreign aid is expanding rapidly.  The foreign aid 
establishment has won the battle for the hearts, minds, and wallets, of western taxpayers.   
Peter Bauer’s prescient warnings and fifty years of evidence notwithstanding, the West is 
about to spend another trillion dollars on foreign aid in the next couple of decades.  
Should a person concerned with economic development be despondent? 
  12The answer, I think, is no.  First, the humanitarian case remains strong.   Even if 
only a nickel or a dime of the Western taxpayer’s dollar is actually spent on the needy 
recipients in the developing world, the relative benchmark of comparison is how that 
dollar would be spent alternatively.  Since it is unlikely to be retuned to the taxpayer, it 
would probably be spent on government projects that are almost comparably wasteful, 
and where the ultimate recipients of cash are not nearly as needy of assistance.   The main 
question about humanitarian assistance is whether it actually hurts development.   
But it seems to me that there is an even better reason not to be despondent, 
namely that foreign aid is a sideshow.  As I have already noted, recent decades have been 
a spectacular period for economic and social development in most of the world.  The 
financial crisis has slowed things down, and has allowed a new voice to bad ideas, but it 
is unlikely to reverse the basic trends.  The reason for the extraordinary economic is 
social progress is simple: the world has increasingly embraced capitalism.  The name of 
the game has been better policy, not foreign aid.  More secure property rights, freer trade, 
lower taxes, better – if still far from perfect – government accountability, and more 
prudent public finance have all contributed to economic growth.   Today, the world is a 
radically more pro-market place than it was thirty years ago, and it is growing rapidly.   
There is reason for continued optimism.  The many rumblings from the left, and a 
few setbacks in places like Argentina and Venezuela notwithstanding, the evidence seems 
to indicate that this embrace of capitalism is durable.   The crisis is a setback, but not a 
reversal.  And if developing countries continue to embrace market policies and 
institutions, then growth is likely to continue as well.   The intellectual consensus around 
pro-market policies is far more important than the billions of dollars of foreign aid.   
  13Indeed, let me end this paper with a conjecture.  The number of people living in 
absolute poverty has been shrinking rapidly, largely due to the incorporation of 
developing countries into the world’s economy.  Since 1970, the number of people living 
on less than $1 a day has shrunk from 26% to 18% of the world’s population (which grew 
enormously), thanks largely to market policies and rapid growth in Asia (see Shleifer 
2009).  The percentage is continuing to fall rapidly as more countries join the global 
economy.  As long as globalization continues, poverty will indeed be reduced 
substantially over the next decade or two.  I suspect that the advocates of foreign aid will 
take credit, even though such aid will have little to do with the reductions of poverty.   
But, fundamentally, who cares? 
Peter Bauer may have lost his battle against foreign aid.  But he has won the war 
for capitalism, and it is for that victory that he must be remembered.   
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